In the 1980s, philosophical, historical and social studies of science underwent a change which later evolved into a turn to practice. Analysts of science were asked to pay attention to scientific practices in meticulous detail and along multiple dimensions, including the material, social and psychological. Following this turn, the interest in scientific practices continued to increase and had an indelible influence in the various fields of science studies. No doubt, the practice turn changed our conceptions and approaches of science, but (...) what did it really teach us? What does it mean to study scientific practices? What are the general lessons, implications, and new challenges? This volume explores questions about the practice turn using both case studies and theoretical analysis. The case studies examine empirical and mathematical sciences, including the engineering sciences. The volume promotes interactions between acknowledged experts from different, often thought of as conflicting, orientations. It presents contributions in conjunction with critical commentaries that put the theses and assumptions of the former in perspective. Overall, the book offers a unique and diverse range of perspectives on the meanings, methods, lessons, and challenges associated with the practice turn. (shrink)

The subject of the present inquiry is the approach-to-the-truth research, which started with the publication of Sir Karl Popper's Conjectures and Refutations. In the decade before this publication, Popper fiercely attacked the ideas of Rudolf Carnap about confirmation and induction; and ten years later, in the famous tenth chapter of Conjectures he introduced his own ideas about scientific progress and verisimilitude. Abhorring inductivism for its apprecia tion of logical weakness rather than strength, Popper tried to show that fallibilism could serve (...) the purpose of approach to the truth. To substantiate this idea he formalized the common sense intuition about preferences, that is: B is to be preferred to A if B has more advantages andfewer drawbacks than A. In 1974, however, David Millerand Pavel Tichy proved that Popper's formal explication could not be used to compare false theories. Subsequently, many researchers proposed alternatives or tried to improve Popper's original definition. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that Arrow’s well-known impossibility theorem is instrumental in bringing the ongoing discussion about verisimilitude to a more general level of abstraction. After some preparatory technical steps, we show that Arrow’s requirements for voting procedures in social choice are also natural desiderata for a general verisimilitude definition that places content and likeness considerations on the same footing. Our main result states that no qualitative unifying procedure of a functional form can simultaneously satisfy the requirements of Unanimity, (...) Independence of irrelevant alternatives and Non-dictatorship at the level of sentence variables. By giving a formal account of the incompatibility of the considerations of content and likeness, our impossibility result makes it possible to systematize the discussion about verisimilitude, and to understand it in more general terms. (shrink)

In this paper we report on our experiences with using network analysis to discern and analyse ethical issues in research into, and the development of, a new wastewater treatment technology. Using network analysis, we preliminarily interpreted some of our observations in a Group Decision Room session where we invited important stakeholders to think about the risks of this new technology. We show how a network approach is useful for understanding the observations, and suggests some relevant ethical issues. We argue that (...) a network approach is also useful for ethical analysis of issues in other fields of research and development. The abandoning of the overarching rationality assumption, which is central to network approaches, does not have to lead to ethical relativism. (shrink)

In this article, we develop an approach for the moral assessment of research and development networks on the basis of the reflective equilibrium approach proposed by Rawls and Daniels. The reflective equilibrium approach aims at coherence between moral judgments, principles, and background theories. We use this approach because it takes seriously the moral judgments of the actors involved in R & D, whereas it also leaves room for critical reflection about these judgments. It is shown that two norms, namely reflective (...) learning and openness and inclusiveness, which are used in the literature on policy and technological networks, contribute to achieving a justified overlapping consensus. We apply the approach to a case study about the development of an innovative sewage treatment technology and show how in this case the two norms are or could be instrumental in achieving a justified overlapping consensus on relevant moral issues. (shrink)

There has been considerable work on practical reasoning in artificial intelligence and also in philosophy. Typically, such reasoning includes premises regarding means–end relations. A clear semantics for such relations is needed in order to evaluate proposed syllogisms. In this paper, we provide a formal semantics for means–end relations, in particular for necessary and sufficient means–end relations. Our semantics includes a non-monotonic conditional operator, so that related practical reasoning is naturally defeasible. This work is primarily an exercise in conceptual analysis, aimed (...) at clarifying and eventually evaluating existing theories of practical reasoning (pending a similar analysis regarding desires, intentions and other relevant concepts). (shrink)

In this rather technical paper we establish a useful combination of belief revision and verisimilitude according to which better theories provide better predictions, and revising with more verisimilar data results in theories that are closer to the truth. Moreover, this paper presents two alternative definitions of refined verisimilitude, which are more perspicuous than the algebraic version used in previous publications.

The notion of template has recently been discussed in relation to cross-disciplinary transfer of modeling efforts and in relation to the representational content of models. We further develop and disambiguate the notion of template and find that, suitably developed, it is useful in distinguishing and analyzing different types of transfer, none of which supports a non-representationalist view of models. We illustrate our main findings with the modeling of technology substitution with Lotka-Volterra Competition equations.

Kuipers' choice to let logical models of a theory represent the applications or evidence of that theory leads to various problems in ICR. In this paper I elaborate on four of them. 1. In contrast to applications of a theory, logical models are mutually incompatible. 2. An increase and a decrease of a set of models both represent an increase of logical strength; I call this the ICR paradox of logical strength. 3. The evidence logically implies the strongest empirical law. (...) 4. A hypothesis and its negation can both be false. My conclusion therefore reads that we should not identify (newly invented) applications of a theory with its logical models, but with partial models that can be extended to the logical model(s) of the language used to formulate the theory. As an illustration I give a model theoretical account, based on partial models, of the HD-method and crucial experiments. (shrink)

Introduction Harry Collins is internationally recognized as a distinguished sociologist of science who writes creatively on a substantial number of varied subjects. He is acknowledged as one of the prominent specialists on the topic of tacit knowledge and has played an important role in the introduction of this topic into science studies. He has investigated the topic extensively, most famously through several case studies of physics [Collins 1974, 1984, 1985, 1990, 2001a,b, 2004], [Collins &...

Introduction Harry Collins is internationally recognized as a distinguished sociologist of science who writes creatively on a substantial number of varied subjects. He is acknowledged as one of the prominent specialists on the topic of tacit knowledge and has played an important role in the introduction of this topic into science studies. He has investigated the topic extensively, most famously through several case studies of physics [Collins 1974, 1984, 1985, 1990, 2001a,b, 2004], [Collins &...

In this paper, we discuss and extend the taxonomy of tacit knowledge proposed by Collins in his 2010 book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. First, we question the definition and the name of one of Collins’s three categories of TK, namely Relational Tacit Knowledge (RTK). After having explained the true fundamental principle that individuates RTK as one category distinct from the two others (Somatic Tacit Knowledge STK and Collective Tacit Knowledge CTK), we suggest an alternative name for RTK, which fits this (...) principle better. Second, our analyses identify a possible ambiguity in the interpretation of RTK, STK and CTK, and indicate how to avoid the related possible confusions. For this purpose, we introduce several notations that specify Collins’s ones. The corresponding developments strengthen and specify a point implicitly suggested in Collins’s book, namely the existence of a serious asymmetry between RTK on the one hand, and STK/CTK on the other. Third, the paper attempts to elaborate and complete Collins’s framework. In this vein, we introduce the possibility of different sub-types of RTK. One of these sub-cases raises the issue of individual, intellectual tacit knowledge—a case that does not seem to have any place in Collins’s picture. We also look at Collins’s framework in a dynamical perspective, and discuss the possibility—not considered by Collins—of dynamic transformations between some of the three categories. Finally, we make two suggestions in order to avoid confusions or misunderstandings when using Collins’s distinctions. When the qualities “explicit”, “explicable” or “tacit” are attributed to some knowledge, these qualities should always be accompanied by the specification for whom and when. Moreover, the attributions “explicit” and “explicable” should always indicate which of Collins’s four senses is meant—elaboration, transformation, mechanization or scientific explanation. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss and extend the taxonomy of tacit knowledge proposed by Collins in his 2010 book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. First, we question the definition and the name of one of Collins’s three categories of TK, namely Relational Tacit Knowledge (RTK). After having explained the true fundamental principle that individuates RTK as one category distinct from the two others (Somatic Tacit Knowledge STK and Collective Tacit Knowledge CTK), we suggest an alternative name for RTK, which fits this (...) principle better. Second, our analyses identify a possible ambiguity in the interpretation of RTK, STK and CTK, and indicate how to avoid the related possible confusions. For this purpose, we introduce several notations that specify Collins’s ones. The corresponding developments strengthen and specify a point implicitly suggested in Collins’s book, namely the existence of a serious asymmetry between RTK on the one hand, and STK/CTK on the other. Third, the paper attempts to elaborate and complete Collins’s framework. In this vein, we introduce the possibility of different sub-types of RTK. One of these sub-cases raises the issue of individual, intellectual tacit knowledge—a case that does not seem to have any place in Collins’s picture. We also look at Collins’s framework in a dynamical perspective, and discuss the possibility—not considered by Collins—of dynamic transformations between some of the three categories. Finally, we make two suggestions in order to avoid confusions or misunderstandings when using Collins’s distinctions. When the qualities “explicit”, “explicable” or “tacit” are attributed to some knowledge, these qualities should always be accompanied by the specification for whom and when. Moreover, the attributions “explicit” and “explicable” should always indicate which of Collins’s four senses is meant—elaboration, transformation, mechanization or scientific explanation. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the overlapping design consensus for the construction of models in design and the related value judgments. The overlapping design consensus is inspired by Rawls’ overlapping consensus. The overlapping design consensus is a well-informed, mutual agreement among all stakeholders based on fairness. Fairness is respected if all stakeholders’ interests are given due and equal attention. For reaching such fair agreement, we apply Rawls’ original position and reflective equilibrium to modeling. We argue that by striving for the (...) original position, stakeholders expel invalid arguments, hierarchies, unwarranted beliefs, and bargaining effects from influencing the consensus. The reflective equilibrium requires that stakeholders’ beliefs cohere with the final agreement and its justification. Therefore, the overlapping design consensus is not only an agreement to decisions, as most other stakeholder approaches, it is also an agreement to their justification and that this justification is consistent with each stakeholders’ beliefs. For supporting fairness, we argue that fairness qualifies as a maxim in modeling. We furthermore distinguish values embedded in a model from values that are implied by its context of application. Finally, we conclude that for reaching an overlapping design consensus communication about properties of and values related to a model is required. (shrink)

In some situations in which undesirable collective effects occur, it is very hard, if not impossible, to hold any individual reasonably responsible. Such a situation may be referred to as the problem of many hands. In this paper we investigate how the problem of many hands can best be understood and why, and when, it exactly constitutes a problem. After analyzing climate change as an example, we propose to define the problem of many hands as the occurrence of a gap (...) in the distribution of responsibility that may be considered morally problematic. Whether a gap is morally problematic, we suggest, depends on the reasons why responsibility is distributed. This, in turn, depends, at least in part, on the sense of responsibility employed, a main distinction being that between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. (shrink)

When many people are involved in an activity, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint who is morally responsible for what, a phenomenon known as the ‘problem of many hands.’ This term is increasingly used to describe problems with attributing individual responsibility in collective settings in such diverse areas as public administration, corporate management, law and regulation, technological development and innovation, healthcare, and finance. This volume provides an in-depth philosophical analysis of this problem, examining the notion of moral (...) responsibility and distinguishing between different normative meanings of responsibility, both backward-looking and forward-looking. Drawing on the relevant philosophical literature, the authors develop a coherent conceptualization of the problem of many hands, taking into account the relationship, and possible tension, between individual and collective responsibility. This systematic inquiry into the problem of many hands pertains to discussions about moral responsibility in a variety of applied settings. (shrink)

In this rather technical paper we establish a useful combination of belief revision and verisimilitude according to which better theories provide better predictions, and revising with more verisimilar data results in theories that are closer to the truth. Moreover, this paper presents two alternative definitions of refined verisimilitude, which are more perspicuous than the algebraic version used in previous publications.

Bible and tradition remain silent on intelligent extraterrestrial life, and few modern theologians have expressed themselves on this topic. Scientific insight suggests the possibility, even likelihood, of the development of life on extrasolar earthlike planets. It is argued that such life forms would resemble earthly life and also develop a religious and moral life. As creatures with free will they would be prone to sin and in need of salvation. It is argued that this would not require multiple incarnations, since (...) Jesus is the cosmic Christ. (shrink)

Sjoerd Griffioen investigates the polemics between Löwith, Blumenberg and Schmitt in the German secularization debate (1950’s-1980’s). ‘Secularization’ is revealed as a contested concept in ideological struggles over modernity and religion, both in this debate and contemporary postsecularism.

Comparison of the concepts of creation from chaos and creation out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo) leads me to reject the latter for several reasons: it is not the biblical concept, and it presents serious conceptual, scientific, and theological problems. Chaos theology is outlined under the headings creation from chaos; chaos and contingency; chaos, evil, and creativity; chaos and incarnation; chaos and eschatology. It is shown to be well suited for the science‐theology dialogue by some examples of its application to (...) aspects of cosmic and biological evolution: initial mystery, separation and ordering; chaos and entropy; contingency and fine‐tuning of the universe; purpose and progressiveness in evolution; and complexity theory and chaos events. (shrink)

In various documents the view emerges that contemporary biotechnosciences are currently experiencing a scientific revolution: a massive increase of pace, scale and scope. A significant part of the research endeavours involved in this scientific upheaval is devoted to understanding and, if possible, ameliorating humankind: from our genomes up to our bodies and brains. New developments in contemporary technosciences, such as synthetic biology and other genomics and “post-genomics” fields, tend to blur the distinctions between prevention, therapy and enhancement. An important dimension (...) of this development is “biomimesis”: i.e. the tendency of novel technologies and materials to mimic or plagiarize nature on a molecular and microscopic level in order to optimise prospects for the embedding of technological artefacts in natural systems such as human bodies and brains. In this paper, these developments are read and assessed from a psychoanalytical perspective. Three key concepts from psychoanalysis are used to come to terms with what is happening in research laboratories today. After assessing the general profile of the current revolution in this manner, I will focus on a particular case study, a line of research that may serve as exemplification of the vicissitudes of contemporary technosciences, namely viral biomaterials. Viral life forms can be genetically modified (their genomes can be rewritten) in such a manner that they may be inserted in human bodies in order to produce substances at specific sites such as hormones (testosterone), neurotransmitters (dopamine), enzymes (insulin) or bone and muscle tissue. Notably, certain target groups such as top athletes, soldiers or patients suffering from degenerative diseases may become the pioneers serving as research subjects for novel applications. The same technologies can be used for various purposes ranging from therapy up to prevention and enhancement. (shrink)

This paper addresses the cultural impact of genomics and the Human Genome Project on human self-understanding. Notably, it addresses the claim made by Francis Collins that the genome is the language of God and the claim made by Max Delbrück that Aristotle must be credited with having predicted DNA as the soul that organises bio-matter. From a continental philosophical perspective I will argue that human existence results from a dialectical interaction between two types of texts: the language of molecular biology (...) and the language of civilisation; the language of the genome and the language of our socio-cultural, symbolic ambiance. Whereas the former ultimately builds on the alphabets of genes and nucleotides, the latter is informed by primordial texts such as the Bible and the Quran. In applied bioethics deliberations on genomics, science is easily framed as liberating and progressive, religious world-views as conservative an... (shrink)

This contribution addresses the anthropocenic challenge from a dialectical perspective, combining a diagnostics of the present with a prognostic of the emerging future. It builds on the oeuvres of two prominent dialectical thinkers, namely Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Hegel himself was a pre-anthropocenic thinker who did not yet thematise the anthropocenic challenge as such, but whose work allows us to emphasise the unprecedented newness of the current crisis. I will especially focus on his views on (...) Earth as a planetary process, emphasising that the “spirit” of technoscience is basically monitoring the impacts of its own activities on geochemistry and evolution. Subsequently, I will turn attention to Teilhard de Chardin, a palaeontologist and philosopher rightfully acknowledged as one of the first thinkers of the Anthropocene whose oeuvre provides a mediating middle term between Hegel’s conceptual groundwork and the anthropocenic present. Notably, I will discuss his views on self-directed evolution, on the on-going absorption of the biosphere by the noosphere, and on emerging options for “sublating” the current crisis into a synthetic convergence towards the Omega point. I will conclude that, after disclosing the biomolecular essence of life, biotechnology must now take a radical biomimetic turn ; that reflection itself must become distributed and collective; and, that the anthropocenic crisis must be sublated into the noocene. (shrink)

A review of the literature on the subject and a discussion involving philosophical analysis, philosophy of science and phenomenology in the style of Merleau-Ponty. The study has practical interest in addition to scientific and philosophical relevance: the way a person conceptualizes his body is important to the way he behaves and the quality of his social interactions. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

In 1968, Jürgen Habermas claimed that, in an advanced technological society, the emancipatory force of knowledge can only be regained by actively recovering the ‘forgotten experience of reflection’. In this article, we argue that, in the contemporary situation, critical reflection requires a deliberative ambiance, a process of mutual learning, a consciously organised process of deliberative and distributed reflection. And this especially applies, we argue, to critical reflection concerning a specific subset of technologies which are actually oriented towards optimising human cognition. (...) In order to create a deliberative ambiance, fostering critical upstream reflection on emerging technologies, we developed the concept of a mutual learning exercise. Building on a number of case studies, we analyse what an MLE involves, both practically and conceptually, focussing on key aspects such as ambiance and expertise, the role of ‘genres of the imagination’ and the profiles of various ‘subcultures of debate’. Ideally, an MLE becomes a contemporary version of the Socratic agora, providing a stage where multiple and sometimes unexpected voices and perspectives mutually challenge each other, in order to strength-en the societal robustness and responsiveness of emerg-ing technologies. (shrink)

"Perfect Worlds offers an extensive historical analysis of utopian narratives in the Chinese and Euro-American traditions.

This article addresses three paradoxes of biomimicry. First of all: how can biomimicry be as old as technology as such and at the same time decidedly innovative and new? Secondly: how can biomimicry both entail a 'naturalisation' of technology and a 'technification' of nature? And finally: how can biomimicry be perceived as nature-friendly but at the same time (potentially at least) as a pervasive biotechnological assault on nature? Contemporary (technoscientific) biomimicry, I will argue, aims to mimic nature at the level (...) of biomolecular processes and structures: contemporary biomimicry as micro-biomimicry. Moreover, building on Aristotle, Delbrück and Schrödinger, I will emphasise that what is mimicked by contemporary (technoscientific) biomimicry, in contrast to traditional (artisanal) instances of biomimicry, is not the morphological form (eidos), but rather the program or formula (logos;) of living systems. Contemporary biomimicry is 'in accordance with nature', but not in the traditional sense. Rather, building on decades of biomolecular research, it strives to reconcile nature and technology against the backdrop of advanced technicity. But biomimetics will only achieve its goals if it is not pursued purely as a technological endeavour, but complemented by an ethos of sustainability and respect for nature. These claims will be elucidated with the help of two case studies: a research project (namely the BaSyC project, launched in 2017 and aimed at producing a synthetic cell) and a science novel (namely Ian McEwan's Solar, which concerns the epistemic and moral challenges involved in artificial photosynthesis). (shrink)

A prominent feature of late nineteenth-century psychology was its intense preoccupation with precision. Precision was at once an ideal and an argument: the quest for precision helped psychology to establish its status as a mature science, sharing a characteristic concern with the natural sciences. We will analyse how psychologists set out to produce precision in 'mental chronometry', the measurement of the duration of psychological processes. In his Leipzig laboratory, Wundt inaugurated an elaborate research programme on mental chronometry. We will look (...) at the problem of calibration of experimental apparatus and will describe the intricate material, literary, and social technologies involved in the manufacture of precision. First, we shall discuss some of the technical problems involved in the measurement of ever shorter time-spans. Next, the Cattell-Berger experiments will help us to argue against the received view that all the precision went into the hardware, and practically none into the social organization of experimentation. Experimenters made deliberate efforts to bring themselves and their subjects under a regime of control and calibration similar to that which reigned over the experimental machinery. In Leipzig psychology, the particular blend of material and social technology resulted in a specific object of study: the generalized mind. We will then show that the distribution of precision in experimental psychology outside Leipzig demanded a concerted effort of instruments, texts, and people. It will appear that the forceful attempts to produce precision and uniformity had some rather paradoxical consequences. (shrink)